We prove that there is no maximal low d.c.e degree.
Introduction
A natural extension of the notion of a computably enumerable (c.e.) set is that of a d.c.e. set which is a set obtained as the difference of two c.e. sets A = W −V . Equivalently, a d.c.e set A is a set for which there exists a computable function f (x, s) so that A(x) = lim s f (x, s), f (x, 0) = 0, and ∀x|{s, f (x, s) = f (x, s + 1)}| ≤ 2. As well as being interesting in their own right, the d.c.e. Turing degrees can be studied both to give insight into the c.e. Turing degrees and into the 0 2 degrees. The investigation of the present paper can be viewed as contributing to all three of these goals.
The uppersemilattice of the d.c.e. degrees is not elementarily equivalent to that of the c.e. degrees by Arslanov [1] and Downey [5] . Perhaps the most striking difference between the d.c.e. degrees and the c.e. degrees comes from the following two theorems.
Theorem 1.1 (Sacks [9])
The c.e. degrees are dense. Also notice that density properties allow us to compare the d.c.e. degrees and the 0 2 degrees. By an unpublished result of Lachlan, there are no minimal d.c.e. degrees, yet Sacks constructed a minimal 0 2 degree. Actually there is a very interesting theme here that "toward 0" the d.c.e. degrees are like the c.e. degrees and "toward 0 ′ " they resemble more the 0 2 degrees. 1 One of the fundamental operators in computability theory is the jump operator. Quite early on it was found that there were noncomputable sets which were indistinguishable from the computable sets by the jump operator.
Definition 1.3 A set A is low if
A recurrent theme in computability theory, and particularly the study of the c.e. sets and degrees, is that low sets should resemble computable sets in their properties. Technically, many results in this vein rely in one form or another on a method invented by Robinson. Robinson proved the following theorem, which is a combination of the well-known Sacks Splitting Theorem and Density Theorem. The lowness hypothesis of L in Robinson's Theorem is necessary as witnessed by Lachlan's Nonsplitting Theorem [7] .
Robinson's Theorem introduced the technique, now called the Robinson technique, which allows us to use lowness for c.e. sets. We will discuss this technique in detail in the proof of our main result. Here it suffices to say that the technique used the lowness of L to, in the limit, answer L 1 questions within the construction, and relied on the enumerability of L to "certify" certain "no" answers within the construction. (This will be explained in detail in the construction below.) Recently, Arslanov, Cooper, and Li [2] claimed a sweeping generalization of the Robinson technique by claiming that Theorem 1.4 could be proven without the hypothesis that L is c.e. Unfortunately their proof contains a fatal flaw.
We do not know if their claimed result in its full generality is correct. One of the consequences claimed by Arslanov, Cooper, and Li was the following.
Theorem 1.6
There is no maximal low d.c.e. degree.
It is the goal of the present paper to give a proof of Theorem 1.6. We believe that our proof of Theorem 
2 Intuition of the Proof of Theorem 1.6
The Robinson technique for c.e. sets
We remind the reader how the Robinson technique works for the Sacks Splitting Theorem and with L c.e. We need a lemma.
The classical application of the Robinson technique is to split any c.e. set A over a low c.e. set L, meeting Sacks type requirements of the form
The basic idea is the same as for the Sacks Splitting Theorem. At a stage s, if we see ℓ(e, i, s) > x where ℓ(e, i, s) = max{y : ∀z < y :
We do this by asking that elements below this use entering A after stage s should be directed into A i and not A 1−i . Then we so preserve the use of the left-hand side and argue that, if we fail to diagonalize, then A is computable, since eventually all but a computable part of A will be directed into A i rather than A 1−i . However, there is a slight problem with this plan. The set L is not under our control. We can preserve
as much as we like, but it is up to the opponent to decide whether this also preserves
The problem is that if we preserve this computation, then the use might be L-incorrect. However, we will have directed some small numbers perhaps into A i , which might fatally injure some lower priority requirement trying to preserve A i . This key insight can be turned around into a proof that not every c.e. degree can be split over all lesser ones [7] .
Here is where we use the fact that L is low and c.e. Since L is low, by the Limit Lemma, there is a computable function g( j, s) so that for every j , lim s g( j, s) = X (L)( j ). For each argument x, Robinson's idea is to build a computably enumerable set U x = W j (x) whose index is given by the Recursion Theorem. This set allows us to use X (L) to "L-certify" computations as follows. Suppose, as above we see ℓ(e, i, s) > x. We need to decide if we should preserve the left-hand side of the computation. Our action would be to put the index n of L ↾ ϕ e (x)[s] into the test set U x . By waiting or speeding up the L-enumeration we may assume that n immediately enters U x . Now if this L-configuration is correct, g( j (x), s) should eventually output 1. Thus we can now mark time and run the enumerations of g and L until a stage t ≥ s is found when either
In the latter case, we will declare the computation to be L-certified and impose restraint. In the former case, we see that the computation
now appears wrong. Furthermore, since L is assumed to be c.e., we actually know
). In this case we impose no restraint for any y ≥ x. We would repeat this process each time we see ℓ(e, i, s) > x. If we see infinitely many L-certified computations we actually restrain, then we will impose only finitely much overall restraint for x, and we can show that the overall restraint is finite for a fixed N i e .
2.2
The problem where L is 0 2 .
We can still try to use a process as above with L no longer c.e. Indeed we can have an enumeration of L given by the Limit Lemma, L = lim s L s , meaning that for each z L s (z) = L s+1 (z) only finitely often.
Imagine that we attempt the above construction with L simply low but not c.e. At some stage we again see ℓ(e, i, s) > x. Again we need to decide whether to impose restraint on A 1−i ↾ ϕ e (x) [s] . Of course, we can put n as above into some test set U x . If we receive a "yes" answer with an L-certified computation then, as before, we could impose restraint. But suppose that we get a "no" answer at t. That means that
We have a choice. Should we impose restraint or not?
If we do impose restraint, then we are back to square one. Now the restraint could be infinite since
because of unbounded use on the left-hand side. Thus the overall restraint could restrain the noncomputable part of A from A 1−i , killing lower priority requirements.
If we don't impose restraint (the method suggested by Arslanov, Cooper, and Li), then perhaps small numbers enter A i at stage t. However, perhaps really
. This is because, quite distinct from the c.e. case,
Perhaps elements enter and then leave, or vice versa. But now, since we did not impose restraint at stage t, A 1−i might have changed. The crucial point is that now the set U x is useless. That is, now U x really does contain an index of a prefix (an initial segment of) L, and henceforth g( j (x), s) can simply return 1.
There does seem to be a class of low sets for which the Robinson technique seems to work. These low sets are sets with not only a lowness certification, but a "low enumeration." We will explore this idea elsewhere.
The proof of our theorem
We will assume that we are given a low d.c.e. set L. We will construct a 0 2 set and a d.c.e. set A so that T L ⊕ A and A T L. We satisfy the requirements below. The only action for such requirements is to put some numbers into A and, in the full construction, restrain those numbers from leaving A. 3 The action of M e is the following. We pick a follower x and wait until L e (x) = 0 at some stage s. As above, we put the L-use n = L s ↾ ψ e (x) into U e . Precisely as above, we find the least t ≥ s such that either n = L t ↾ ψ e,s (x), or g( j, t) = 1, in which case we L-certify the computation and put x into A t . We will protect this number's removal from A with priority e. We put x into A t only when the computation is L-certified. It may later happen that we were wrong, but this happens at most finitely often by the definition of g. Notice that once we put x into A, we only need to pick a new follower
That is, inductively all the followers we have put into A for the sake of M e must be incorrect. This entails that all of the apparent initial segments of L ever put into U e must also be wrong. This happens at most finitely many times. The point is there is at most one n ∈ U x,s so that n = L s ↾ m for some m at any stage s. The usual argument for this is to ensure that U is a prefix free set. There are some minor problems to ensure this.
The argument for the N-type requirements is significantly more subtle. For N-type requirements, we also apply the Robinson technique and the FriedbergMuchnik strategy. We never put any numbers into (but may extract some numbers from) A for these requirements. For every requirement N e , we try to ensure that
for some x by putting x into (or pulling x out of) at most finitely often. Fixing x, we try to ensure (x) = A⊕L e (x). Let n = L s ↾ ϕ e,s (x). Again we enumerate n into a c.e. set V which we shall build during the construction. Again we may assume that we have in advance an index j such that V = W j . Again we find the least t ≥ s such that either n = L t ↾ ϕ e,s (x), or g( j, t) = 1. In the case that g( j, s) = 1, we L-certify the computation and change (x). This case can only occur finitely often, as usual.
It is what we do in the case that g( j, t) = 0 and n = L t ↾ ϕ e,s (x) that causes us problems. We will ensure that there is at most one n ∈ V s so that n = L s ↾ m for some m at any stage s. We will ensure that V is a prefix free set. Suppose that we are in this case. There are two basic possibilities:
This is the good case. The set L is d.c.e. and hence this z can never return.
This is the real problem. Now it might in the future be possible for
The main idea is that should such a future stage s ′ occur, with g(x, s ′ ) = 1, we will be able to claim that we can make A s ′ +1 ↾ ϕ e,s (x) = A s ↾ ϕ e,s (x) by extraction of numbers from A. That is, we are claiming that since we have not been left of L s , A v will not have been left of A s for any stage v with
It is by no means clear that we will be able to so restore A, and this is the core of our construction. It would well seem that perhaps the first time we saw some potential stage to act, we had some p in A s , and some other N k might act before stage s ′ in the sense of the above, perhaps causing elements to leave A v for some stage v with s < v ≤ s ′ . (Recall that only N-type requirements extract elements from A.) If this could occur then we would have no hope of making A d.c.e. and still meeting the requirements. The section below is devoted to the analysis of two N-type requirements above an M-type one and showing that "timing" considerations make this scenario impossible.
Two N-strategies above one M-type requirement
Suppose there are two requirements N 0 and N 1 above a requirement M 0 . Suppose at the current stage s, n ∈ V 1,s ′ for some s ′ < s and n is an initial segment of L s ↾ ϕ 1,s ′ (x 1 ) and g( j 1 , s) = 1.
Thus, at stage s, N 1 desires to restore the computation at stage s + 1 back to the stage s ′ configuration ≤ ϕ 1 (x 1 )[s ′ ]. We would like to be able to pull all of the elements z < ϕ 1,s ′ (x 1 ) which are in A s but not in A s ′ out of A. We claim
. Otherwise, there must exist some number z < ϕ 1,s ′ (x 1 ) which was in A s ′ but was pulled out at a stage s ′′ between s ′ and s. Since we do not extract numbers for the action of M-type requirements, z must have been pulled out by N 0 or N 1 .
(i) z was pulled out by N 1 itself. Then, inductively, we must have restored a computation at stage s ′′ to an earlier stage t < s ′ (since z ∈ A s ′ but z / ∈ A s ′′ ). Since L is d.c.e., there cannot be any number y < ϕ 1,t removed from L t between stage t and s ′′ . Otherwise, the computation at stage t cannot be restored. But the computation at stage t was destroyed by L, so
(ii) z was pulled out by N 0 . Then, inductively, we must have restored a computation of N 0 at stage s ′′ to an earlier stage
(iia) ϕ 0,t ≤ ϕ 1,s ′ . It means there is a number below ϕ 1,s ′ which left L by stage s, and so the computation at stage s ′ cannot restored. The point here is that we did nothing for N 0 at stage s ′ , and hence L t ↾ ϕ 0,t must be right of L s ′ ↾ ϕ 0,t , a contradiction. We now turn to the formal details of this finite injury argument.
3 The Proof of Theorem 1.6
Basic module
For M e we build a c.e. set U whose index i is given by the Recursion Theorem.
1. Pick a large fresh follower m.
Wait for
A ↾ m + 1 = L ↾ m + 1[s]. 3. Put n = L ↾ ψ(m)[s] into U .
Run the enumerations of g and L until
Case (1) g(i, t) = 1. Put m into A t +1 . Declare that m is used, and restrain it with priority M e from leaving A.
Case (2) L ↾ ψ(m)[t] changed. Go to step (2).

If
and m has been used go back to step (1) .
For N e , we build a c.e. set V . By the Recursion Theorem, we assume V has index j . 
Subcase (2)
Otherwise. Go to step (2).
Construction
Order the priorities of the requirements M 0 , N 0 , M 1 , . . . . For every requirement N e , we build a c.e. set V e and by the Recursion Theorem, it has an index j (e), and similarly U e = W i(e) for M e . Every set we are constructing except A and is a local set. We will differentiate between R requiring attention, and R acting. It will only be in the latter case that R will initialize lower priority requirements to preserve its action. Also we will use the phrase "speed up the Lenumeration to wait for . . . to occur." We will regard this as happening in one step of the construction, so that any action can be taken at the current stage. This avoids having stages where nothing is done while we are waiting for some pending decision for some requirement, and considerably simplifies the notation. We will use the L-enumeration given by this process within the stage. Thus, if some requirement receives attention and, while we are examining it, we see some new L-configuration consistent with some g(i, t) or g( j, t) because some number entered or left L t − L s , then we will regard this version of L, L t , as replacing L s , when the next requirement is considered. We will simply always denote the current version by L s and will regard its meaning as being clear by context. Requirements will be considered in increasing order of priority at each stage to see if they require attention. At most one requirement can require attention and at most once per stage. We say a requirement R requires attention at stage s + 1 if one of the following holds.
R = M e
Case (1) M e has no unused follower, and the length of agreement between L and A has just increased. Then our action is to appoint an (unused) follower m s to M e . Case (2) M e currently has an unused follower assigned at some stage t < s, so that m e,s = m e,t , and A s ↾ m e,t + 1 = L s e,s ↾ m e,t + 1. (It will be the case that A s (m e,t ) = 0 = L s e,s (m e,t ).) Set U e,s+1 = U e,s ∪ {n} where n = def L s ↾ ψ e,s . Speed up the L-enumeration L and g(i (e), s) until a stage s ′ > s so that either L s ′ ↾ ψ e,s (m e,t ) = L s ↾ ψ e,s (m e,t ) or g(i (e), s ′ ) = 1. In the former case, do nothing. If g(i (e), s ′ ) = 1 then declare that m e,s is used, and that M e acts. Initialize lower priority requirements. Enumerate m e,s into A s+1 .
R = N e .
Case (1) N e has no follower at stage s. Our action is to appoint a fresh number m = m e,s to follow N e . Here N e acts and we initialize all lower priority requirements. (m e,t ), or L s extends some n ′ = L ↾ ϕ e,u (m e,t )[u] already in V e,s and g( j (e), s) = 1.
Case (2)
Subcase (2.0) No. Do nothing.
Subcase (2.1) Yes and n = L ↾ ϕ e (m e,t )[s] does not extend some initial segment already in V e,s . Speed up the enumeration of L and g( j (e), s) until a stage s ′ > s so that either L s ′ ↾ ϕ e,s (m e,t ) + 1 = L s ↾ ϕ e,s (m e,t ) + 1 or g( j (e), s ′ ) = 1. In the former case, we do nothing. If g( j (e), s ′ ) = 1 then N e acts. The action is to initialize lower priority requirements, and make
(m e,t ).
Subcase (2.2)
Yes and n = L ↾ ϕ e (m e,t )[s] is compatible with, that is, L s extends, some n ′ = L ↾ ϕ e (m e,t )[u] for some t < u < s already in V e,s . Speed up the enumeration of L and g( j (e), s) until a stage s ′ ≥ s so that either L s ′ ↾ ϕ e,s (m e,t ) + 1 = L s ↾ ϕ e,s (m e,t ) + 1 or g( j (e), s ′ ) = 1. In the former case, we do nothing. If g( j (e), s ′ ) = 1 then N e acts. The action is to initialize lower priority requirements, cause A ↾ ϕ e,s (m e,t )[s + 1] = A u ↾ ϕ e,u (m e,t ), and make s+1 (m e,t ) = L s ⊕A s e,s (m e,t ) (which will happen if we restore s+1 (m e,t ) = u (m e,t ).
(Naturally we will need to check that this can be done while making A d.c.e.) Notice that the follower m e for N e will never be canceled once it is defined provided that N e has priority (meaning that we have reached a stage where higher priority requirements have ceased to act on the construction).
Verification
We prove that every requirement is satisfied and acts and is initialized at most finitely often, by induction on the priority f . Select the least stage s 0 so that all of the requirements of higher priority than R f have ceased activity. Note if a requirement receives attention without acting then it will never put (or pull) anything into (out from) A and/or . Suppose all of the following lemmas are true for every requirement of priority higher than R f . Suppose R f is M e or N e . Define V e = ∪ t ≥s V e,t and U e = ∪ t ≥s U e,t . Lemma 3.1 For each M e -requirement, U e is prefix free, A = L e , and M e acts only finitely often.
Proof We work after the stage s 0 where M e will never again be initialized. First, we prove U e is a prefix free set. It suffices to prove U e,s ′ is prefix free for every s ′ ≥ s 0 . Suppose we put an initial segment n s ′ = L s ′ ↾ ψ s ′ (m e,s ′ ) into U e,s ′ +1 at stage s ′ + 1. If U e,s+1 were not prefix free, then there must a segment n t = L t ↾ ψ t (m e,t ) compatible with n s ′ which has been put into U e,t +1 at some stage s 0 ≤ t + 1 < s ′ .
1. ψ t (m e,t ) < ψ s ′ (m e,s ′ ) and L s ′ ↾ ψ t (m e,t ) = L t ↾ ψ t (m e,t ). If m e,t < m e,s ′ then we will have acted for m e,t to have appointed m e,s ′ ,
e,s ′ (m e,t ). Hence M e would not have received attention at stage s ′ , a contradiction. If m e,t = m e,s ′ , then by the basic properties of uses for reductions the corresponding n t and n s ′ cannot be compatible.
Again if we assume the two ns to be compatible, it can only be that m e,s ′ = m e,t , and so m e,s ′ was appointed after we acted for M e using m e,t . But then, m e,s ′ is appointed as a fresh number and we would have made m e,s ′ to exceed all previous uses seen in the construction at the stage u with t + 1 ≤ u < s ′ at which it was appointed. In particular, m e,s ′ , and hence ψ s ′ (m e,s ′ ), will exceed ψ t (m e,t ), so this case cannot occur.
Now choose a stage s ′ ≥ s 0 so that ∀t ≥ s ′ (g(i (e), t) = g(i (e), s ′ )). There are two cases.
1. g(i (e), s ′ ) = 0. Select a stage s ′′ ≥ s so that a follower m e,s ′′ has been defined and A s ′′ (m e,s ′′ ) = 0. Then it will never be initialized and M e will never require attention after s ′′ . U e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫}ގ‬ = ∅. This means that L e (m e,s ′′ ) is undefined or defined and = 0, and so M e is satisfied and will never require attention. 2. g(i (e), s ′ ) = 1. Since U e is prefix free, |U e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫|}ގ‬ ≤ 1.
So |U e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫|}ގ‬ = 1. Select a stage s ′′ ≥ s ′ so that |U e,s ′′ ∩ {L t ↾ n, n ∈ ‫|}ގ‬ = 1 for every stage t ≥ s ′′ . Then there must be one follower m ≤ |U e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫|}ގ‬ so that L (m) = 0. So M e must have acted to put m into A. So the requirement will never require attention after stage s ′′ .
Lemma 3.2
For each N e requirement, V e is prefix free, = L⊕A e and N e requires attention only finitely often.
Proof Again we work at stages s ≥ s 0 after which V e is initialized for the last time. In the following we are proving the lemma above, but not proving here that A is d.c.e. The construction for N e only asks us to restore A to earlier configurations. We will in a subsequent lemma ensure that such restorations are possible while still keeping A d.c.e. First, we prove V e is prefix free. Suppose there is a follower m e,s at stage s, and this is the least stage after s 0 when N e picks a follower. Then, by construction, this follower is immortal. Let m e = m e,s . Notice that this follower and any activity after stage s 0 cannot affect anything of higher priority than N e as the numbers involved are too big by initialization.
It suffices to prove V e,s ′ is prefix free for every s ′ ≥ s. Suppose we put a number n s ′ = L s ′ ↾ ϕ s ′ (m e ) into V e,s ′ +1 at stage s ′ + 1. If V e,s+1 were not prefix free, then inductively, if s ′ is the least stage where it becomes nonprefix free, there must a number n t = L t ↾ ϕ t (m e ) which has been put into U e,t +1 at some stage s ≤ t + 1 < s ′ and this initial segment is compatible with n s ′ .
At the stage t + 1 when we enumerated n t into V e , we would have had a computation
(m e ) ↓= t (m e ). The way the construction works is that we would not add n s ′ to V e . (Rather we would check in Subcase (2.2) to see if we can L-certifiably via g( j (e), s ′ ) restore A to force a disagreement. Thus this cannot occur.) So V e must be prefix free. Now select the least stage s ′′ ≥ s 0 so that ∀t ≥ s ′′ (g( j (e), t) = g( j (e), s ′′ )).
1. g( j (e), s ′′ ) = 0. Then N e will never require attention after s ′′ . By the Recursion Theorem, V e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫}ގ‬ = ∅. It is immediate that L⊕A e
(m e ) = (m e ) 2. g( j (e), s ′′ ) = 1. Since V e is prefix free, |V e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫|}ގ‬ ≤ 1, and since lim s g( j (e), s) = 1, we see |V e ∩ {L ↾ n, n ∈ ‫|}ގ‬ = 1. Select the least stage, say t, t ≥ s at which we put some the n e = L t ↾ ϕ e,t (m e ) ∈ {L ↾ m, m ∈ ‫}ގ‬ into V e,t . Now this is a real initial segment of L and it is in V e at every stage after t. 
Lemma 3.3
A is d.c.e.
Proof If this is not true then there is some number x which enters and leaves more than once. The only requirements that act in a non-c.e. manner upon A are the N e s. It follows that there must be two requirements N a and N b where N a acts to take a number out of A and N b acts to put it back in. Since N b acts after N a 's action, it must have higher priority than N a , as it was not initialized by N a 's action (in which case its numbers would be too big). Now since N a acts to take x out of A at some stage s a , it can only do so through the action of Subcase (2.2) of the construction. That is, we must have seen L s a extending some n a in V a . This n a was put into V a at some stage t a < s a . At this stage we would have had an apparent L⊕A a (m a ) = (m a ) computation not corresponding to some earlier configuration in V a . It must have been that x ∈ A t a . Thus x must have entered A at some stage v after stage t a and this can only happen through the action of some M k of lower priority than both N a and N b since M k did not initialize them. Since M k has lower priority and x is smaller than ϕ a (m a ), it must have been that N a did not act at any stage before v, since otherwise x would have been too big. (We remark that here and below, no M-type requirement can ever re-enumerate a number since whenever they once enumerate it, if that number is then extracted by some N that N must have had higher priority, initializing M, causing it to pick a fresh number to follow it.) We can only conclude that for all stages between t a and v,
Now if N b acts to put x back into A, then since it restores A to a configuration corresponding to a
, it must have been that x was already in A q . Since this configuration must occur before the stage s a where N a acts to take x out of A, we must conclude that
But now we have a contradiction. For N a to act before N b acts, we would need that L moves right so that L s a extends L t a ↾ ϕ a (m a )[t a ]. However, since N b does not act before stage s a (lest it initialize N a ), we must have that g( j (b), s) = 0 for stages q ≤ s ≤ s a , and this must be L-certified in the sense that L s cannot be compatible with L q ↾ ϕ b (m a ) [q] . (Otherwise Subcase (2.2) would apply to N b .) Since s = s a is a special case of this noncompatibility, L s a cannot be compatible with Proof It suffices to prove for every uncanceled follower m e and e ∈ ‫,ގ‬ (m e ) ↓. But every requirement requires attention at most finitely often. So it is true.
This is only possible if
ϕ b (m b )[q] > ϕ a (m a )[t a ]. But finally we have a contradiction. L s a ↾ ϕ a (m a )[t a ] is right of L t a ↾ ϕ a (m a )[t a ].
Some Comments
It is not difficult to modify the construction above to prove the following. Again the argument is finite injury. Now after stage s = s(e) where N e is initialized for the last time by higher priority requirements, N e has the ability to restore A at will to any configuration involving A ↾ ϕ u (e)[u] for stages s(e) ≤ u, and the ability to protect such restorations by initializing lower priority requirements. Thus we will use V e and g in the same way after s(e) (the final incarnation of V e ), to either see L s extending something already in V e which is g-certified (g(e, s) = 1) or we see Proof By Corollary 4.1. Now we finish with some brief remarks about extensions to our results. We think it is not hard (but tedious) to show that our argument works for L is n-c.e. (ω ≥ n > 1), using a nonuniform proof. We have not checked this in detail.
We want to explain why our argument does not work to solve Question 1.7. In our proof we can ensure A to be d.c.e. since no other requirements force A to change more often. However, in Question 1.7, we failed to construct such a d.c.e. set since we must put the numbers into A 1−i while we pull them out from A i . This can happen many (although finitely many) times for a fixed number. This is the crucial difference between a Friedberg strategy and a Sacks strategy. Although we do not know whether Question 1.7 has a positive solution in the d.c.e. degrees, this method can be used to split every c.e. degree into two ω-c.e. degrees over any lesser low d.c.e. degree. The trick is that we can bound the times at which both A i s change by a computable function. 4 Finally we remark that Kučera has observed that there are some limitations on the interactions of the c.e. degrees and the low degrees. He observed that by Theorem 2 of Kučera [6] in relativized form combined with the low basis theorem, we can show that given any low degree d there is a low PA degree p > d. Then by his priority-free solution to Post's problem, there is a c.e. nonzero degree a < p. The upshot is that a ∪ d is therefore low.
